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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

GALEN L. JONAS,

:

Appellant/Petitioner.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Case No. 880411-CA
Priority No. 2

:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petition for Rehearing of an appeal from a judgment and
conviction for Theft by Receiving, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989) and
76-6-412(1)(b) (1978); Theft by Receiving, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989) and
76-6-412(1)(c) (1978); and Theft by Receiving, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989) and
76-6-412(1)(b) (1978), in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. Banks,
Judge, presiding.

Following briefing and oral argument, this Court

issued its opinion in State v. Jonas. Case No. 880411-CA, on May 22,
1990, affirming the conviction.
attached as Addendum A.

A copy of the Court's opinion is

INTRODUCTION
This Petition for Rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In Brown v. Pickard. denying

reh'cr, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established the
standard for granting a petition for rehearing, stating:
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be
made. We must be convinced that the court failed
to consider some material point in the case, or
that it erred in its conclusions . . . .
11 P. at 512. Later, in Cumminas v. Nielson. 129 P. 619 (Utah
1913), the Court added:
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter
of right, and we have no desire to discourage the
practice of filing petitions for rehearings in
proper cases. When this court, however, has
considered and decided all of the material
questions involved in a case, a rehearing should
not be applied for, unless we have misconstrued or
overlooked some statute or decision which may
affect the result, or that we have based the
decision on some wrong principle of law, or have
either misapplied or overlooked something which
materially affects the result . . . If there are
some reasons, however, such as we have indicated
above, or other good reasons, a petition for a
rehearing should be promptly filed and, if it is
meritorious, its form will in no case be
scrutinized by this court.
129 P. at 624. The argument section of this brief will establish
that, applying these standards, this Petition for Rehearing is
properly before the Court and should be granted.

In its opinion in

State v. Jonas, No. 880411-CA (filed May 22, 1990) (attached as
Addendum A), this Court misapprehended and/or misconstrued the facts
and law.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The facts and circumstances of this case establish that
the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to excuse Juror
Smith for cause.

The Courts opinion ignores the juror,s repeatedly

expressed concerns that she could not be impartial and failed to
consider the dictates of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Jones,
734 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987), that "a later assertion by the juror
that he or she can render an impartial verdict cannot attenuate the
earlier expressions of bias."
The facts and circumstances of this case demonstrate that
the contact between the bailiff and jurors was more than brief and
incidental in nature, and the State failed to rebut the presumption
of prejudice raised by the nature of the contact.

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
(See Addendum B for Text.)
Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Article I, § 7, Utah Constitution
Article I, § 12, Utah Constitution
Amendment VI, United States Constitution
Amendment XIV, United States Constitution
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THIS COURTS DECISION THAT THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
EXCUSE PROSPECTIVE JUROR SMITH MISAPPLIES THE
FACTS AND IS IN CONFLICT WITH EXISTING CASE LAW.
In reaching its decision that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in failing to excuse Juror Smith for cause,
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this Court determined that the juror's responses did not raise an
inference of partiality or prejudice.
880411-CA (filed May 22, 1990).

State v. Jonas. Case No.

The Court focused on the juror's

statement that she might be "a little" influenced if the case
involved tools and determined that
This case did not involve tools, so it could be
inferred that the prior experience did not
influence her at all.
Jonas, slip op. at 8.

The Court's decision ignores the juror's

later statement that it probably would be difficult for her to be
impartial.

Id. at 7.

It also ignores the obvious fact that both

the crime in which the juror had been a victim and the crime before
the Court in the instant case were theft related.

It further fails

to take into account her repeated expressions of concern that she
would be biased and her emotional response to police officers'
failure to get the tools back.
In State v. Suarez, Case No. 880309-CA (filed May 25,
1990), an opinion issued three days after the opinion in the instant
case, a different panel in this Court, comprised of Judges Orme,
Davidson and Billings, reversed a criminal conviction and remanded
the case for a new trial based on the trial judge's failure to
excuse for cause a juror who gave inconsistent responses to similar
voir dire questions in two separate courtrooms. The defendant in
Suarez filed an affidavit from the defense attorney in another case
which indicated that the juror at issue had indicated in the other
courtroom that he was biased in favor of police testimony.

Relying

on State v. Hewitt. 689 P.2d 22, 27 (Utah 1984), and State v.
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Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980), a panel of this Court
determined that the juror should have been excused for cause.
Suarez, slip op. at 9.

Given the direct statements by the juror in

this case that it would probably be difficult for her to be fair and
impartial, the same result should have been reached in the instant
case.
This Court also determined that even if an inference were
raised, the juror's subsequent responses showed that her concern was
merely the product of a "light impression" and not one that would
"close the mind against the testimony that might be offered in
opposition [citation omitted]."

On the contrary, her final

statement acknowledged her emotional reaction to the incident.
Furthermore, after numerous other statements which indicated an
emotional reaction to the fact the police "didn't do anything" and
she still had not gotten her possessions back, and a repeated
concern that she might be influenced by the incident, a single
statement by the juror that she believed she could be impartial does
not "attenuate the earlier expressions of bias."
As the Utah Supreme Court noted in State v. Jones, 734
P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987), citing State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 884
(Utah 1981):
When a prospective juror expresses an attitude of
bias, a later assertion by the juror that he or
she can render an impartial verdict cannot
attenuate the earlier expressions of bias.
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Mr. Jonas respectfully requests rehearing on this issue
and that he be granted a new trial based on the trial judge's abuse
of discretion in failing to excuse Juror Smith for cause.

POINT II. THE CONTACT BETWEEN THE BAILIFF AND
JURORS WAS MORE THAN INCIDENTAL, AND THE
PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE RAISED BY THAT CONTACT
WAS NOT REBUTTED.
In its opinion, this Court determined that "the contact
between the bailiff and the jurors before the jury began
deliberating was an incidental contact raising no presumption of
prejudice."

Jonas, slip op. at 12.

In his opening brief, Mr. Jonas argued that the contact
raised a presumption of prejudice.
Although there is disagreement as to the
specifics of what the bailiff said to the jurors
in this case ( . . . ) , the information which is
included in the transcript establishes that the
contact between the bailiff and the jurors was
more than brief and incidental and went beyond
mere civilties. At the very least, the bailiff
informed the jurors of the reason that another
juror had been excused. He made them aware that
the juror's sister had been murdered in a highly
publicized incident that had occurred over the
weekend.
The bailiff's action in informing the jurors
of a reason for excusing another juror was outside
his role as a bailiff and went beyond any
permissible contact that might be allowed as part
of his duties in shepherding the jury. The
statement tended to heighten the jurors7 awareness
of crime in the community and would give rise to
all of the reactions, fears and concerns that
people feel when considering society's current
level of criminal activity. The nature of the
information was far more intense and of a more
prejudicial nature to a criminal defendant than a
conversation about a bunged toe or a witness7
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job. In addition, any follow-up commentary by the
jurors or the bailiff concerning the specific
incident or crime in general, none of which was
recorded but which it is reasonable to assume
occurred, could have a significant prejudicial
impart on a criminal defendant whose case was
currently being tried.
Information to the jurors regarding the
reason for excusing Mr. Davis should have been
carefully controlled. Instead, the bailiff
imparted the information in a completely
uncontrolled situation where Mr. Jonas and his
attorney had no opportunity to hear what was said
and no opportunity to have input or comment on the
information or to object to it being conveyed.
Because the bailiff is viewed by the jury as
an extension of the court and because his position
is that of a court official, his statements carry
great weight. See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S.
[363 (1966)] at 365. Furthermore, he has a
responsibility to monitor and control his actions
and statements while in the presence of the jury
so as to not taint them. Since the bailiff's
contact with the jury as a whole went beyond one
of a brief and incidental nature, a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice was raised by his
unauthorized comments.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 27-8. This argument is based on the
facts and circumstances of the instant case and is not merely an
assumption that the presumption was raised.
The State agreed in this case that the presumption was
raised, stating:
Despite being a brief and a natural outgrowth of
the relationship between bailiff and jury, it is
reasonable to classify the encounter as one in
which a rebuttable presumption of prejudice would
rise.
State's Brief at 45. Mr. Jonas respectfully requests that this
Court reconsider its decision that the presumption was not raised in
the instant case.
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Both of the reasons for the rule, as articulated in
State v. Pike. 712 P.2d 277, 279-80 (Utah 1980), are applicable to
situations where a bailiff rather than a witness has unauthorized
contact with jurors.

First, it is inherently difficult to prove the

effect of the contact on the juror, and second, the appearance of
impropriety causes a deleterious effect upon the judicial process.
Because the bailiff is an extension of the court and wears an emblem
of authority, he has a greater potential for impact on a juror than
many witnesses.
This Court states that M[t]here was no exchange at all
because the jurors said nothing."

Jonas, slip op. at 12. The facts

in this case do not support such a statement; the bailiff was not
asked and did not volunteer information regarding the statements or
physical reactions made in response to the information.

Mr. Jonas

contends that the State had the burden of establishing lack of
prejudice once the presumption arose; the State failed to establish
that the jurors said or did nothing in response, and this Court
erroneously determined that no such exchange* occurred.
Although the truth of the bailiff's statement is not at
issue, its impact on the jurors is. If jurors were discussing high
crime rates or emotional reactions to crime with the bailiff, or
even among themselves, in response to the bailiff's information,
they were impacted by the information.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Jonas respectfully requests that this Court either
reverse his conviction or rehear the issues set forth herein.
DATED this

\°l

day of June, 1990.

<^Cu}(2>/
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner

CERTIFICATION
I, JOAN C, WATT, do hereby certify the following:
(1) I am the attorney for Appellant/Petitioner in this
case;
(2) This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this
Court in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case.
Respectfully submitted this /v

day of June, 1990.

*srtfi-LttXtif
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that eight copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

/j

day of June, 1990.

JOAN C. WATT

DELIVERED by

this

of June, 1990.
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ADDENDUM A

FILED
MAY 2 2/990
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
M *>• Court
Dtth OLun •* Appeals

ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Galen L. Jonas,

Case No. 880411-CA

Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Jay Banks
Attorneys: Joan Watt, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Davidson, Jackson, and Larson.1
JACKSON, Judge:
Defendant appeals a jury verdict finding him guilty of
three counts of theft: (1) theft by receiving, a third-degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989)
and § 76-6-412(b) (1978), on July 17, 1985, and (2) on July 30,
1985, and (3) theft by receiving, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989) and
§ 76-6-412(c) (1978), on July 25, 1985. We affirm.
Defendant seeks reversal of the convictions or a new
trial on five grounds: (1) insufficient evidence; (2) failure
to excuse a prospective juror for cause; (3) a bailiff's
allegedly improper contact with jurors; (4) failure of the
court reporter to provide an accurate transcript of the
evidentiary hearing on a motion for mistrial; and (5) denial of
a motion to recuse the trial judge. We will review each of
defendant's challenges in turn.
1. John Farr Larson, Senior Juvenile Court Judge, sitting by
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10)
(Supp. 1989).

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
The standard of review of a jury verdict challenge based
on insufficiency of the evidence is as follows:
[W]e view the evidence presented and all
inferences that can be drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the verdict.
Where there is any evidence, including
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
it/ from which findings of all the elements
of the crime can be made beyond a reasonable
doubt/ our inquiry is complete and we will
sustain the verdict.
State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3/ 10 (1989) (citations
omitted). Stated another way# we will reverse a jury
conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence/
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict/ "'is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.'"
State v. Cobb. 774 P.2d 1123/ 1128 (Utah 1989) (quoting State
v. Markham, 750 P.2d 599/ 601 (Utah 1988)).
In August 1986/ defendant was charged with seven counts of
theft by receiving arising out of separate transactions in 1985
and 1986. Four of the transactions occurred in July 1985.
There were no transactions between July 30/ 1985/ and March 4,
1986. The three 1986 transactions took place in March/ April/
and May.
There was no essential difference in the State's evidence
regarding each of the seven transactions. The police conducted
a sting operation. On each occasion charged/ an undercover
police officer sold/ and defendant purchased, various
merchandise/ consisting principally of equipment and appliances
that the police had purchased beforehand or that was unclaimed
evidence in police custody.2 In each instance/ the officer
posed as a thief or fence selling stolen goods for about
2. The merchandise purchased in the seven transactions was,
respectively/ (1) Fischer VCR and Samsung TV, (2) Toshiba TV,
(3) RCA and Magnavox video recorders, (4) three microwave
ovens, (5) chain saw# (6) grill/ air compressor, and kerosene
lantern, and (7) Fischer VCR.

880411-CA
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ten cents on the dollar. He usually wore an audio recorder and
some transactions were videorecorded. These recordings were
played and submitted to the jury. The police documented the
goods sold and the monies defendant paid.
Defendant does not dispute the State's evidence. Instead,
he claims that he knew the property he received in July 1985
was not stolen. Thus, he asserts that he did not have the
culpable mental state that is a necessary element of the crime
charged. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) (Supp. 1989) provides,
with our emphasis:
A person commits theft if he receives,
retains, or disposes of the property of
another knowing that it has been stolen, or
believing that it probably has been stolen,
or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in
concealing, selling, or withholding any such
property from the owner, knowing the
property to be stolen, with a purpose to
deprive the owner thereof.
Defendant testified that he recognized as a police officer the
undercover agent who sold him the merchandise in July 1985.
Defendant also testified that he knew before all of the
transactions that the property was not stolen. He claimed that
this knowledge was based on information provided to him by two
persons, James Lawrence Prater, a confidential police
informant, and defendant's acquaintance, Officer Brown.
Defendant and his wife testified that Prater told them in July
1985 about the sting operation but said "not to worry about it,
that the merchandise was not stolen." Prater had arranged the
first meeting between defendant and the undercover officer.
Prater was not available at trial to corroborate or rebut the
conversation testimony. On the other hand, Officer Brown did
testify. Brown stated that in the fall of 1985, after the July
transactions, defendant told him that he had been introduced by
Prater to a man who had some damaged warehouse property that he
would sell cheap to defendant. Defendant told Brown he thought
Prater might be an undercover officer or an informant.
Defendant's next contact with Brown was on March 29, 1986, when
he directed Brown to an anticipated drug transaction which did
not materialize. In May or June 1986, defendant spoke to Brown
again. He showed Brown some property and asked Brown to check
the national computer system, NCIC, to see if it was stolen.
Brown remembered seeing an air compressor, saw blades, and a
television. Defendant also gave Brown some serial numbers to

check out. Brown reported to defendant that those items were
not stolen. Brown believed that the checking on NCIC was done
before defendant's arrest on August 1/ 1986. But police
records indicated only one NCIC check by Brown/ on August 14/
1986.
Defendant was convicted on the 1985 charges and acquitted
on the 1986 charges. The jury could have chosen to disbelieve
defendant's story about the 1985 Prater conversation/ his
recognition of the property seller as a police officer/ and his
knowledge about the status of the property at the time he
received it in July 1985/ even if they accepted defendant's and
Brown's testimony regarding defendant's knowledge or belief
regarding the unstolen status of the property he received in
1986. The jury, not the appellate court/ performs the function
of determining the credibility of a witness's testimony. State
v. Lactod. 761 P.2d 23/ 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). A person may
be convicted of theft by receiving even if the property is not
in fact stolen property. State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169/ 1173
(Utah 1985)/ if the State proves that the defendant acted under
the belief that the property was stolen, ifi. at 1172. Unless
evidence that supports the jury's verdict is so insubstantial
that the jury must necessarily have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime charged/ we are
obligated to assume the jury believed the evidence which
supports the verdict. State v. Brooks. 631 P.2d 878/ 884 (Utah
1981). Nor will we overturn a conviction merely because the
jury chose not to believe the defendant. Lactod, 761 P.2d at
27. There is substantial evidence from which the jury could
reasonably conclude that defendant/ at the time of the July
1985 transactions/ believed that the property was stolen,
despite his self-serving assertion at trial that he believed
otherwise in July 1985. We therefore reject defendant's
challenge to the jury's verdict.
JURY SELECTION
After the completion of jury voir dire, defendant
challenged one member of the venire for cause. Defense
counsel/ in an unreported conference at the bench/ excepted to
the trial court's denial of that request. The next day,
defense counsel entered his exception upon the record in the
following form:
MR. YENGICH: . . . I failed—the Court
allowed me to take exception to the
Court's failure t o —

880411-CA
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THE COURT:

Make a record.

MR. YENGICH: —exclude Juror Number—
prospective Juror No. 6. She is the lady
that indicated she had been burglarized in
the past and initially said—
THE COURT:
wasn't it?

Ten or twenty years before/

MR. YENGICH: Well, I don't know. The
record will speak to that. She indicated
initially an indication that she did not
think she could be fair and impartial and
I at the ben[ch] excepted to her as
indicating an implied bias of that
particular juror and I used a peremptory
challenge to strike her.
THE COURT:

The record may so show.£33

Defendant's exception was based on the following voir dire
colloquy between the trial court and juror Smith:
THE COURT: All right. I almost hate to
ask this question, but I'm obligated to.
Have any of you been the victims of a
theft? And that, as I've indicated to you
before what a theft really is, taking
property of another with intent to
permanently deprive them, or in
receiving. Well, we'll take that first.
I saw some hands go up in the jury box.
All right. Mrs. Smith? I assume all you
women are married unless you tell me
otherwise.
3. Although defense counsel spoke of "implied bias," the
record indicates that the court and opposing counsel understood
that the legal basis of the challenge to prospective juror
Smith for cause was "actual bias." Subsections (e)(1) through
(e)(13) of Utah R. Crim. P. 18 state grounds of implied bias or
bias at law, i.e., bias arising from status. Subsection
(e)(14) sets forth actual bias, i.e., bias arising from state
of mind, as a ground for a challenge for cause.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: Yes, my
husband had about $13/000 worth of tools
stolen about a year and a half ago which
we have never—
THE COURT: Did a criminal act result from
that—or action?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: No, it was
reported to the police, which they didn't
do anything about, and we still have never
gotten—
THE COURT:

They didn't find it?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:

(shook head

from side to side)
THE COURT:

How long ago was that?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
and a half ago.

About a year

THE COURT: Keeping that incident in mind,
as I indicated, there are different
parties involved, but sometimes based on
our experience we allow that to interfere
with our thinking.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: It might be.
If it was tools, I might be a little
influenced.
THE COURT: Well, wait just a minute. Let
me ask the questions and you just answer
the question.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:

All right.

THE COURT: Bearing that in mind, do you
believe that that incident would make it
difficult for you to be fair and
impartial, particularly to this Defendant,
as well as the people of the state of Utah?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
hard to say.

880411-CA
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It's a little

THE COURT: Well/ you just take time to
think it over because we—you're the one
that—
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
would/ yes.
THE COURT:

Let's see.

It probably

You're M r s . —

PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:
Smith.

Smith/ Donna

THE COURT: You don't believe that you
could set those facts aside and make a
determination on the evidence that's
presented in this case?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: I—well/ yes#
I believe I could be impartial.
THE COURT: We know you didn't like to
lose the tools.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH:

NO/ I didn't.

Defendant's objection to prospective juror Smith is based
on Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(14) (codified at Utah
Code Ann. § 77-35-18(e)(14) (1982)/ repealed effective July 1/
1990)/ which provides:
The challenge for cause is an objection to
a particular juror and may be taken on one
or more of the following grounds:
. . . .

(14) that a state of mind exists on the
part of the juror with reference to the
cause/ or to either party/ which will
prevent him from acting impartially and
without prejudice to the substantial
rights of the party challenging . . . .
On appeal/ defendant contends the trial judge committed
reversible error by rejecting his challenge of Smith for
cause. In his brief/ he summarizes this claim of error as
follows:

The trial judge abused his discretion in
failing to excuse Juror Smith for cause
after she indicated that she had been a
victim of a crime similar to the crime
charged and that she believed such
experience would interfere with her
ability to be impartial.
A motion to dismiss a prospective juror for cause is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v.
Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989). When reviewing such
a ruling, we reverse only if the trial court has abused that
discretion by committing harmful error. !£. The general rule
concerning abuse of discretion is that the appellate court
••will presume that the discretion of the trial court was
properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the
contrary.- Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah
1984); £££ State v. Williams. 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985).
An appellant has the burden of establishing that reversible
error resulted from an abuse of discretion. State v. Bishop,
753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988).
A court commits prejudicial error if it forces a party to
exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror
who should have been removed for cause. Gotschall, 782 P.2d at
461; State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1989); Bishop,
753 P.2d at 451. When comments are made by a juror which
facially bring into question that prospective juror's
partiality or prejudice, an abuse of discretion may occur
unless the court or counsel investigates further and finds the
inference rebutted or dismisses the juror. See Cobb, 774 P.2d
at 1127.
The Cobb holding suggests a two-part procedure. When the
threshold of apparent partiality or prejudice is crossed and an
inference arises, the court must determine from further inquiry
of the venire member whether the inference is rebutted. Thus,
our first question is: Did Smith's initial comments raise an
inference of partiality and prejudice on her part as to this
cause or this defendant? We think not* She stated that the
prior theft of her husband's tools might influence her thinking
a little, if this case involved tools. This case did not
involve tools, so it could be inferred that the prior
experience would not influence her at all. As the trial court
pressed her further, she expressed some concern while weighing
her feelings about her ability to be fair but, upon final
weighing, she expressed affirmative belief in her impartiality.
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Juror Smith's mild initial responses are in stark contrast to
those of the two prospective jurors in State v. Brooks, 631
P.2d 878 (Utah 1981), who crossed the Cobb threshold. They
stated that their strong adverse emotional responses as former
crime victims would affect their thinking; Smith did not. They
identified a residue of personal trauma which would compromise
their capacity for objectivity; Smith did not. Their expressed
states of mind supported an inference that they could not act
with impartiality/ defined as "a mental attitude of appropriate
indifference- in State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799/ 801 (Utah
1977)/ while Smith's expressed state of mind did not support a
similar inference.
Finally/ even assuming, arguendo, that Smith's initial
comments raised on their face a threshold inference of
partiality and prejudice, her subsequent responses to the
judge's questioning show her concern was merely the product of
a "light impression" and not one that would "close the mind
against the testimony that might be offered in opposition."
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451 (quoting State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765/
768 (Utah 1980)).
For these reasons/ we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to grant defendant's request
for removal of Smith from the jury panel for cause.
BAILIFF CONTACT
The parties rested their presentations on Friday, April 22,
1988/ after four days of trial. The trial court then scheduled
jury instruction and closing arguments for Monday morning/
April 25. That weekend, a sister of juror Davis was shot to
death during a robbery of a local video store. Juror Davis
informed the court on Monday morning that he could not continue
as a juror due to the fact that his pregnant sister had been
murdered. Upon stipulation of counsel/ the court excused Davis
from further jury duty and an alternate juror moved into
Davis's place on the jury. Davis, upon his departure from the
courthouse/ asked the bailiff to explain his absence to the
other jurors, and the bailiff then did so.
Defense counsel, upon learning of the bailiff's contact
with the jury, moved for a mistrial because the bailiff "did
inform them of that." The court denied the motion without
prejudice. Later, the bailiff was placed under oath and
testified as follows about his contact with the jury:

(Whereupon, Judge Banks placed Bailiff
HUGH BELL under oath, who testified as
follows:)
THE COURT: State your name.
THE WITNESS: Hugh Bell.
THE COURT: And you are Deputy Sheriff?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Bailiff of this court?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: This morning at nine o'clock
Mr. Davis came in and stated reasons to
the Court why he would like to be excused
from the case, and would you tell us the
sequence of events that happened after he
left the chambers?
THE WITNESS: He came into the courtroom
and asked for statement of service on his
jury duty and I went to Joan, found where
the statement was, got her to fill one out
for him, gave it to him. I walked to the
door and expressed my sympathy to him and
everything, and he asked me if I would
tell the rest of the jurors what happened,
why he was excused.
THE COURT: And what did you do?
THE WITNESS: I went in and I told them
that Mr. Davis wouldn't be in because his
sister was the lady that was shot out in
West Valley.
THE COURT: Were they discussing the case
or the incident at all when you went in?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: Did you ever hear them discuss
it?
THE WITNESS: They didn't know a thing
about it.
THE COURT: All right, you may
cross-examine.
MR. YENGICH: No cross-examination.
Defense counsel immediately renewed his mistrial motion "on the
basis of the record."4 Again, his motion was denied.

4.

See note 7, infra.
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On appeal, defendant argues that/ "by informing the
remaining jurors that the trial court had excused another juror
and the reason for that excuse, the bailiff interfered with Mr.
Jonas' right to a trial by an impartial jury/" guaranteed by
the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution.5 He
relies on the declaration in State v. Pike. 712 P.2d 277,
279-80 (Utah 1985)/ that "[a]nything more than the most
incidental contact during the trial between witnesses and
jurors casts doubt upon the impartiality of the jury and at
best gives the appearance of the absence of impartiality.M In
Pike, an important prosecution witness (an arresting officer
and eyewitness) engaged three jurors in conversation about a
personal incident. The Utah Supreme Court concluded that a
rebuttable presumption of prejudice from the juror-witness
contact was established because "the conversation amounted to
more than a brief/ incidental contact and no doubt had the
effect of breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly
affect the juror's judgment as to [the witness's]
credibility." Pike. 712 P.2d at 281. Once such a presumption
is raised/ the court reaffirmed/ the burden is on the
prosecution to prove that the unauthorized contact did not
influence the juror.6 I£. at 280; see State v. Erickson, 749
5. Although defendant mentions Article 1/ sections 10 and 12
of the Utah Constitution in his appellate brief, this issue was
neither raised below nor adequately briefed or argued on
appeal. We therefore confine our analysis to the federal
constitution. See State v. Marshall, 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 45/ 51
n.4 (Ct. App. 1990).
6. This rule has its Utah roots in State v. Thorne, 39 Utah
208/ 117 P. 58 (1911)/ in which two officers took the jury to
lunch at a public hotel in the midst of their deliberations.
One juror and one officer left the group and the juror talked
to someone on the telephone. The record did not show whom the
juror talked with or what was said. The court concluded:
From the conduct disclosed and the
exposure of the juror to harmful
influences/ prejudice is presumed/ and the
burden cast on the state to show what the
communication was# and that it was
harmless and could not have influenced or
affected the deliberations of the juror or
his verdict.
Id./ 117 P. at 66.

P.2d 620 (Utah 1987); State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987)/ cert, granted, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1988).
Pike identifies two reasons for the rule that a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice arises from a nonincidental witness
contact with a juror: (1) the inherent difficulty in proving
how or whether a juror has in fact been influenced by
conversing with a participant in the trial, and (2) the
deleterious effect upon the judicial process because of the
appearance of impropriety from such contact. Pike, 712 P.2d at
280.
In the instant case, the trial court did not indicate
whether the denial of defendant's motion was based on a
determination that the contact was incidental or that the
contact was nonincidental, but the resulting presumption of
prejudice was rebutted. On appeal, defendant assumes that the
contact between the bailiff and the jurors was presumptively
prejudicial because it was more than "a brief, incidental
contact where only remarks of civility were exchanged."
Erickson, 749 P.2d at 620.
In light of the enunciated reasons for the rule reaffirmed
in Pike, we conclude that the contact between the bailiff and
the jurors before the jury began deliberating was an incidental
contact raising no presumption of prejudice. Erickson and Pike
and all the other Utah cases cited by defendant involved
conversational contacts between a juror and a trial witness.
In such circumstances, it is appropriate to characterize any
verbal contact beyond mere civilities as nonincidental because
it might influence the juror's ability to assess impartially
the credibility of that witness. Jurors should not, as a
matter of course, talk to witnesses about the case at hand or
about anything else. According to Pike, the substance of any
such conversation does not dictate application of the
presumptive prejudice rule. The rule is applied, first,
because of the potential for the conversation's subtle effect
on the juror's ability to assess the credibility of the trial
participant with whom he has conversed. Here, however, unlike
the juror-witness cases relied upon by defendant, no
"conversation" took place, in the normal sense of an "oral
exchange of sentiments, observations, opinion^ [or] ideas."
Webster's Third I n f l Dictionary 458 (1986). [There was no
exchange at all because the jurors said nothing^ The bailiff
merely conveyed information about why juror Davis would not be
present for the balance of the trial. In addition, the
bailiff's credibility in the eyes of the jury was not at
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issue. He did not testify.
jury was not relevant.

The truth of his statement to the

We think the facts in this case are more like those in
State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355 P.2d 57 (1960), cert,
denied, 366 U.S. 970 (1961). In Garcia, the contact occurred
at the same stage of the proceedings, i.e., after all the
evidence was in, but before the jury was instructed or the case
argued or submitted. A juror approached the trial judge and
privately asked if the parties would introduce tapes of certain
testimony. The judge responded that he did not know, but would
advise counsel that the juror had inquired. Our supreme court
pointed out that, -while in a sense the juror's conversation
with the trial judge was on a subject connected with the
trial," the judge's response was not. Garcia, 355 P.2d at 59.
Although it would have been improper for the judge to discuss
the issue with the juror, the court stated, the judge's actual
response was proper. I&. The court saw "nothing about this
situation which would tend to prejudice the defendant,"
distinguishing cases in which prejudice was presumed from a
contact between a juror and a witness or interested party
during the deliberative process. J&.
Here, the bailiff's message to the jury had an even more
tenuous connection to the subject of the trial itself than the
verbal interchange in Garcia. Although it was not unintended,
it was not the kind of communication which would prejudice the
jury's judgment regarding their verdict in this case.
The second reason identified in Pike for presuming
prejudice is also absent here. Juror-prosecution witness
contacts make the entire judicial process look collusive or
unfair to the defendant. However, unlike verbal contacts
between jurors and trial participants, verbal contacts beyond
mere civilities between jurors and a bailiff, about subjects
other than those connected with the trial at hand, are expected
and unavoidable since the bailiff is assigned to minister to
the jurors' needs and to be the contact person. We do not
believe that Pike compels the conclusion that prejudice
presumptively results when a bailiff says anything other than
"Hello" or "Good morning" to a juror at a time when the case
has not even been submitted to the jury for deliberations.
Compare Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-9 (1990) (officer in charge of
sequestered jury must not speak with jury "on any subject
connected with the trial") with Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-11
(1990) (officer in charge of jury in deliberations shall "not
permit any person to speak to or communicate with them or to do

so himself except upon the order of the court • . . . " ) ; see
Still v. State, 484 P.2d 549 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971)
(unauthorized communication between bailiff and jury during its
deliberations would raise presumption of prejudice).
This bailiff did not mingle with the jurors or converse
with them about the trial itself; nor did he interrupt their
deliberations. His brief contact concerning something
tangential to the trial itself did not give rise to any
appearance of impropriety. Thus, the trial court could have
properly concluded that the contact was incidental and raised
no presumption of prejudice.
Because we conclude that the juror-bailiff contact did not
deny defendant his constitutional right to an impartial jury,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
request for a mistrial. See State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah
1988).
MOTION HEARING TRANSCRIPT
Defendant claims that his right of appeal has been
impermissibly impaired because the transcript of the
evidentiary hearing on his mistrial motion is incomplete.
Defense counsel agrees that the bailiff's contact with the
jury, discussed above, was a basis for the initial mistrial
motion,7 which was denied without prejudice. A hearing was
7. Defendant's trial counsel filed an affidavit stating that
he "thinks" he might have had a second ground for the renewed
mistrial motion. If so, that ground would appear in the
transcript of the proceedings. Appellate counsel has not
identified a second ground for our consideration. Trial
counsel's affidavit speculates that the purported second ground
might have related to the prosecutor's closing argument. But
the transcript of closing arguments is complete, without gaps,
and without indication of an unintelligible word. Thus, any
problem with argument could be identified by appellate
counsel. Again, none has been directed to our attention.
Moreover, the transcript reveals that defense counsel did not
interpose any objection during the course of the prosecutor's
argument. Counsel has the unfettered opportunity to interrupt
at any time and request that any portion of an argument be
recorded, and to voice any objection thereto he may desire.
State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918, 921 (Utah 1979). We conclude that
the only actual ground for the renewed mistrial motion was the
bailiff's conduct.
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later held concerning the bailiff-jury contact/ at which the
only witness called to testify was the bailiff. His testimony,
fully quoted above, was short and direct and comported with
defense counsel's report of the jury contact when stated as the
ground for the initial motion. The bailiff's testimony
concerning the content of his message to the jury did not give
rise to a presumption of prejudice. Thus, the inquiry ended,
and when defense counsel renewed the mistrial motion at the
close of the testimony, it was again denied. The transcript of
the court's inquiry, the bailiff's testimony, counsel's motion,
and the court's ruling is complete. That portion of the
transcript has no gaps and no indications of unintelligible
words. The indication "(illegible)" appears solely in
connection with statements of the court and counsel, which do
not form the basis for defendant's claim that the jury was not
impartial. Defense counsel's mistrial motion was renewed on
the "basis of the record," i.e., the bailiff's testimony.
The court reporters' transcripts are virtually complete and
thus amply adequate for us to review defendant's claims. This
transcript is not like the transcript in State v. Taylor, 664
P.2d 439 (Utah 1983), where a new trial was ordered. There, a
juror's responses to voir dire questions were totally absent
from the record and could not be reconstructed. Here, the
bailiff's testimony was totally reported, and there was no need
to reconstruct the record.8 We find the transcript before us
to be functionally adequate for review. Not all deficiencies
or inaccuracies in the record require a new trial. State v.
Perrv, 401 N.W.2d 748, 752 (Wis. 1987). We conclude that the
condition of the transcripts did not deprive defendant of due
process or of the right of appeal guaranteed by Article I,
section 12 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-l-6(l)(g) (1990).9
8. Here, the trial court attempted to "settle the record" due
to defendant's claims about omissions. However, those
omissions were not related to the material issues of this
appeal as discussed in our analysis.
9. Defendant received, at State expense, a full and complete
transcript of his trial consisting of several volumes. He
takes no issue with the adequacy of the transcripts except a
portion of one volume that contains instructions to the jury,
closing arguments, and the hearing on the mistrial motion. The
court reporter for these proceedings on the final day of trial
departed the state and could not be located to prepare that
part of the transcript. The reporter at all other trial
proceedings prepared the entire transcript, utilizing the
written notes of the missing reporter.

TRIAL JUDGE RECUSAL
Defendant filed an affidavit of prejudice against Judge
Banks, pursuant to Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. He alleged that, twenty years earlier, the judge,
as prosecutor, had been forced to dismiss certain criminal
charges against him. Defendant claimed the judge still
harbored resentment towards him arising from the dismissal.
Defendant asserted actual bias of the judge against him,
arising from that incident and from several other criminal
prosecutions of defendant while Judge Banks was prosecuting
attorney.
The trial judge examined the matter consistent with the
rule, Utah R. Crim. P. 29, and statutory procedure, Utah Code
Ann. § 77-35-29(c) (Supp. 1989) (repealed effective July 1,
1990). The court compared defendant's factual allegations with
the court files in each prior case. The court records
demonstrated defendant's affidavit to be factually inaccurate
concerning the judge's direct involvement in the several
prosecutions, with one exception. The judge found that he had
been personally involved in only one of defendant's prior
prosecutions. Regarding that case, Judge Banks stated:
[A] minute entry [is] endorsed on the
Information showing that it was my motion
to dismiss, and the others, the only basis
for any prejudice would be that I was the
District Attorney and that people who
appeared in behalf of the State at the
District Attorney's level were my deputies.
The judge concluded that the defendant's affidavit was
factually insufficient and that prejudice was not shown. The
matter was referred to another trial judge for review pursuant
to Utah R. Crim. P. 29(d). That judge denied defendant's
motion to disqualify Judge Banks and referred the case back to
him for trial.
Defendant has failed to show any actual bias requiring
recusal. We consider State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah),
cert, denied. 108 S.Ct. 2876 (1988), to be controlling. In
Neeley, Judge Banks, as prosecutor, had signed some criminal
informations against defendants and had appeared in court in
one case to accept a guilty plea. Based on those facts, the
court found no actual bias, as required, and no grounds for
reversal. The Utah Supreme Court stated:
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Judge Banks determined that he had no
actual bias against defendant Belt by
reason of his involvement in Belt's
prosecution some twenty years prior. He
then followed the statutorily mandated
procedure to determine whether sufficient
legal grounds existed to require his
disqualification. While it has been
suggested that a trial judge disqualify
himself whenever an affidavit of bias and
prejudice is filed against him in good
faith, this practice is not mandatory.
Neeley, 748 P.2d at 1094.

Continuing, the Court stated:

But, while we recommend the practice that
a judge recuse himself where there is a
colorable claim of bias or prejudice,
absent a showing of actual bias or an
abuse of discretion, failure to do so does
not constitute reversible error as long as
the requirements of section 77-35-29 [Utah
R. Crim. P. 29] are met.
Id.
In light of defendant's failure to establish actual bias or
an abuse of discretion, Judge Banks did not commit reversible
error by refusing to disqualify himself as trial judge.
We affirm defendant's convictions.

Norman H. Jacksonr Judge

WE CON'

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

7^^/N^fa^K^
John Jvarr Larson, Judge

ADDENDUM B

TEXT OF STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in
pertinent part:
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection
to a particular juror and may be taken on one or
more of the following grounds:
(14) That a state of mind exists on the
part of the juror with reference to the
cause, or to either party, which will prevent
him from acting impartially and without
prejudice to the substantial rights of the
party challenging; but no person shall be
disqualified as a juror by reason of having
formed or expressed an opinion upon the
matter or cause to be submitted to such jury,
founded upon public rumor, statements in
public journals or common notoriety, if it
satisfactorily appears to the court that the
juror can and will, notwithstanding such
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the
matter to be submitted to him.
Article I, § 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment,
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall

not be compelled
a wife shall not
her husband, nor
shall any person
same offense.

to give evidence against himself;
be compelled to testify against
a husband against his wife, nor
be twice put in jeopardy for the

Amendment VI to the Constitution of the United States provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the* accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury, of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .

